What stalled Egypt's monorail, and who pays?

At the end of last year, several media outlets reported that the East Nile monorail would open in the first week of January 2026. Weeks later, the line remains idle—another delay in a project that has struggled to stay on schedule.

The postponement carries a heavy price tag. The first line is designed to link the New Administrative Capital with Nasr City in eastern Cairo, while a second will connect 6th of October City to central Cairo. A source involved in the project told Al Manassa that delays have cost at least 45 billion Egyptian pounds (about $882 million).

Officials now say the New Capital line is expected to open before the end of the first quarter of this year. They also argue that a shift in the operating model—toward greater Egyptian participation and away from full foreign management—will help offset part of the financial burden.

What delayed the monorail?

The project has faced a string of obstacles since it was awarded in 2019 to a consortium led by the Canadian transport manufacturer Bombardier. Trial operations did not begin until nearly five years later, in November 2024.

“The original plan was to build and operate the first line, stretching from the New Administrative Capital to Nasr City, in just three years,” said a member of the board of the National Authority for Tunnels, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Once complete, the monorail is meant to connect fast-growing satellite cities—including the New Capital and 6th of October City—to key districts in central Cairo. The network will extend roughly 100 kilometers.

On the ground, construction has already altered the urban landscape. Concrete pillars carrying the elevated track now cut through major roads in Nasr City and 6th of October City. Residents have glimpsed the train during trial runs in Nasr City, but the stations remain closed to the public. 

According to the source, delays began almost immediately. The contract was signed after the 2019–2020 fiscal year budget had already been approved, leaving out the government’s initial advance payment of 9 billion pounds (about $176 million) to the consortium. The payment was deferred to the following fiscal year.

Then came the pandemic.

In 2020, COVID-19 disrupted global trade and supply chains. Contractors struggled to import equipment and secure raw materials from abroad. Work slowed for more than three months at minimum, while workforce numbers were reduced at construction sites to limit the spread of the virus.

Orascom Construction and Arab Contractors are part of the consortium implementing the project under Bombardier’s leadership.

The dollar crunch and rising costs

After weathering the pandemic, the government secured a $2.3 billion loan agreement with UK Export Finance. The funding was primarily allocated to manufacturing the train cars. Construction companies, however, still needed additional foreign currency to import specialized materials required for building works.

As Egypt’s dollar shortage deepened in 2022, contractors faced mounting difficulties securing foreign currency. At times, they received only 50% of their required supplies of key materials such as steel and cement, as factories prioritized exports, the source revealed.

Successive devaluations of the Egyptian pound further drove up construction costs. The gap widened between the contract values agreed upon with the government and the actual costs under soaring inflation.

“After the 2022 devaluation, additional studies were prepared to determine the fair value of the works and to establish a mechanism to compensate contractors so they could continue at the same pace,” the source explained. “But the financial allocations available to the authority were calculated at the pre-devaluation exchange rate, which slowed some works until the end of the fiscal year.”

Starting in 2024, implementation rates began to improve as foreign currency became more available following the Ras El-Hekma investment agreement. The government also amended the mechanism for disbursing contractors’ core dues, reducing payment intervals from every three months to every 45 days to prevent compensation from eroding amid rapid inflation.

Though seemingly technical, the measure helped accelerate progress. It coincided with a reassessment of companies’ entitlements and their phased disbursement in line with the financial allocations for the 2024–2025 fiscal year.

Still, the accumulated delays proved costly. A second source on the board of the National Authority for Tunnels estimated the overruns at no less than 45 billion pounds (about $882 million), equivalent to roughly 806 million euros (about $870 million). That represents nearly 18 percent of the project’s original estimated cost of 4.5 billion euros (about $4.86 billion).

Egyptian management to curb costs

In October 2025, the Egyptian Company for Metro Management and Operation announced it would operate the monorail in partnership with France’s Alstom. Officials say the plan aims to reduce operating costs, replacing an earlier proposal that relied entirely on foreign management.

“The entry of the Egyptian Company for Metro Management and Operation as a partner in managing the project is intended, first, to reduce the cost of the operation and maintenance contract by up to 25%, and second, to build genuine local expertise in operating this type of train,” the second source told Al Manassa. The current contract is valued at approximately 1.5 billion euros (about $1.62 billion) over 15 years.

Final details for establishing the new operating entity are expected to be completed in the coming days, clearing the way for commercial operations and passenger service, anticipated later in the first quarter of this year, the source explained.

Reducing operation and maintenance costs will depend largely on increasing the share of Egyptian labor, whether in passenger-facing services such as ticket sales and train driving, or in technical roles related to maintaining systems and rolling stock.

Alstom’s role will be limited to specialized technical tasks for which local expertise is not yet available, with knowledge gradually transferred to Egyptian workers through structured training programs.

Officials say the model mirrors the trajectory of the Cairo Metro, whose management and operation were eventually fully transferred to Egyptian hands.

The project’s total workforce is estimated at about 400 engineers and technicians. The first group of 100—all Egyptians—is currently undergoing training. At launch, Egyptian staff are expected to make up around 90% of the workforce, compared with 10% French experts. Within two years, foreign expertise is projected to decline to just 5%.

Despite officials’ insistence that localization will contain costs, some experts argue that the project’s original conception reflects a broader misallocation of public resources.

“Large-scale projects like the monorail will not be a radical solution to the transportation crisis, given the enormous costs of implementation and operation,” noted Amr Essam, an urban planning expert and researcher at the University of Houston. “Ultimately, its benefits will be limited to a relatively small segment compared with other forms of mass transit.”

Ticket prices have not yet been announced. Essam expects fares to reflect the project’s high costs—potentially pushing many commuters toward taxis or private cars and limiting the environmental gains officials have promised.