Riyadh’s Red Sea dilemma: What can Egypt offer without getting dragged in?

One day after Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited Cairo to meet with President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Saudi Arabia requested defensive support from Egypt and other nations to counter escalating Houthi missile and drone strikes, AP reported. The disclosure coincided with an announcement from Egypt’s Border Guards confirming ongoing joint operations with Saudi Arabia to secure the Gulf of Aqaba and the southern Red Sea.

The request puts Egypt in a delicate position. Cairo has given no indication that it plans to enter the Yemeni war directly, and there has been no official announcement that Egypt will deploy troops or air defense systems to Saudi Arabia. But with the conflict moving closer to the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, Egypt must weigh how to support Riyadh while protecting its own Red Sea interests and avoiding direct confrontation with Ansar Allah.

The stakes are particularly high for Egypt because the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandeb form the southern gateway to the Suez Canal. At the same time, instability in the Strait of Hormuz and disruptions to other Saudi oil export routes are increasing pressure on the kingdom, making the security of alternative routes through the Red Sea more important.

In a report published Wednesday, AP cited regional officials as saying Saudi Arabia is experiencing a shortage of interceptor missiles. The kingdom has reportedly asked Egypt, France, Britain, and Pakistan to deploy air defense support in the region to counter missiles and drones launched by Ansar Allah.

The request follows a depletion of the US stockpile of interceptor missiles, which was partially consumed during the war with Iran. Saudi Arabia also relies heavily on Washington for weapons and military support.

The AP report does not confirm that Egypt has accepted the request, and there are no public indications that any of the countries approached have provided the requested military support. The report nevertheless places bin Salman’s Cairo visit in a broader context, as Riyadh seeks alternatives to US military backing while facing repeated missile and drone attacks and uncertainty over whether Washington is prepared to intervene militarily on its behalf.

Joint coordination in the Red Sea

The day after bin Salman’s visit to Cairo, Egyptian Border Guards Commander Maj. Gen. Osama Abdel Hamid Dawoud said Egypt was maintaining continuous coordination with Saudi Arabia to secure their shared borders, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the southern Red Sea.

Speaking to Al Arabiya, Dawoud said the coordination includes regular meetings and information sharing, with the two sides discussing security measures as regional developments unfold.

This statement does not necessarily mean Egypt has begun moving to support Saudi Arabia against Ansar Allah, Major General Nasr Salem, a professor of strategic sciences at the Nasser Higher Military Academy, told Al Manassa.

Egyptian-Saudi coordination in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea is a routine process, Salem said, adding that neighboring countries regularly coordinate to secure their borders, waters, and vital areas and to prevent cross-border threats. It is therefore not necessarily linked to bin Salman’s visit or the current escalation.

Its timing is nevertheless significant because the fighting is moving closer to maritime corridors that form part of the vital sphere for both Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Bab Al-Mandeb at the heart of Egypt’s calculations

The pressure on Saudi Arabia comes as Ansar Allah has expanded its control over strategic areas overlooking Bab Al-Mandeb and islands previously under Saudi influence, while Saudi Arabia continues to face missile and drone attacks.

Regional sources cited by Reuters said the advance had prompted Riyadh to seek assistance from Egypt, although there is no confirmed Egyptian commitment to provide military support.

For Egypt, the developments matter even without direct involvement in the Yemeni war. Any deterioration in Red Sea security affects the maritime routes leading to the Suez Canal, which has been severely damaged in recent years by reciprocal strikes between Ansar Allah and the Israeli military.

Bab Al-Mandeb is one of the world’s key routes for oil and trade, and further disruption would put additional pressure on maritime traffic through the Red Sea. That pressure comes as instability in the Strait of Hormuz has increased the importance of alternative routes for Saudi oil exports.

Saudi Arabia is therefore facing pressure on multiple fronts. The Strait of Hormuz is volatile to the east, while Bab Al-Mandeb is under pressure to the south. The East-West pipeline was also subjected to an attack that disrupted its operations, limiting the kingdom’s ability to rely on alternative routes for exporting oil.

What can Cairo do?

Any Saudi request for assistance would have to be studied by the relevant Egyptian institutions, Salem said. That assessment would determine the nature of the threat, the risks involved, and the capabilities required before Egypt decides what form of assistance it could provide.

Egypt should not preempt that process by announcing a specific military response, he said. Threats should first be addressed through political, diplomatic, and other peaceful means before military capabilities are considered.

Salem said Cairo does not hesitate to support an Arab country when asked, but that does not necessarily mean entering a direct military confrontation. The first step, he said, is to identify the threat and determine what Egypt can provide without exceeding its own capabilities or interests.

That leaves Cairo with options beyond deploying air defense systems or troops to Saudi Arabia. Possible forms of support include intelligence and information sharing, expanded security coordination, protecting Egypt’s own maritime sphere and approaches to the Red Sea, and supporting diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions.

The AP report said Egypt and Oman are leading diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict in Yemen, while Saudi Arabia is seeking to rally its allies against Ansar Allah.

Between mediation and military involvement

For Cairo, the equation is far more complex than a binary choice between military intervention and total non-involvement.

On one hand, the security of the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandeb is inextricably linked to Egyptian national security, particularly through its direct line to the Suez Canal. On the other hand, direct military entanglement in the Yemeni conflict carries risks and costs fundamentally different from routine border and territorial water defense.

For this reason, Salem expects Egypt to begin by defining the precise nature of the threat and evaluating available tools, emphasizing that political and diplomatic avenues remain the primary line of response before any decision to use military force.

He said the objective should be to prevent the conflict from developing into a broader Arab war. Any confrontation between Arab parties ultimately produces losses for those involved, he added.

Salem considers Bab Al-Mandeb and the Red Sea part of Egypt’s vital sphere and said Cairo would not accept a threat to its national security or Arab national security in the region. He also said the agreement between El-Sisi and bin Salman on joint cooperation creates scope for Egyptian involvement, whether through mediation or, if necessary, military support.

But the form and extent of that involvement remain unclear. Riyadh is seeking interceptor missiles and partners to protect its cities and oil facilities, while Washington is pursuing a diplomatic path to avoid another war. For Cairo, the challenge is to protect the Red Sea and its own interests, support Saudi Arabia, and use its political and security tools to contain the escalation without becoming a direct party to the conflict.