The Inside Story of The Power Struggle within Hamas: Meshaal’s pragmatism VS Al-Hayya’s rifle

Amid the political crisis storming Hamas since the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in July 2024, followed by Yahya Sinwar in Oct. 2024, the group’s General Shura Council had finally been called to an emergency session to elect a new head of the Political Bureau. Four top Hamas leaders who spoke to Al Manassa on condition of anonymity said the move is meant to mend a rift within the movement and to settle the dispute between one current led by Khaled Meshaal from outside Gaza and another that favors leadership from inside the enclave, represented by Khalil Al-Hayya.

The Shura Council meeting, which had been scheduled for December, was postponed to early January 2026 due to logistical and security complications affecting communication channels.

The four sources who spoke separately to Al Manassa confirmed that some members of the Political Bureau/executive board had put forward Meshaal as a candidate for the top post, while Gaza leaders nominated Al-Hayya.

Those nominations came amid sharp polarization between the “external current” led by Meshaal, whose approach is described as pragmatic and seeking to restore ties with the Sunni bloc, and the “Gaza current” represented by Al-Hayya, the movement’s leader in Gaza and Sinwar’s former deputy, who holds to what could be called “Sinwarism”; an approach centered on alliance with Iran.

The four sources, two of whom are members of Hamas’ Political Bureau, a third is a member of the Shura Council, and the fourth is closely tied to a third political bureau member; all said Hamas’ internal bylaws state that Leaders are not allowed to nominate themselves for senior posts, they are rather chosen through endorsement. This makes the balance of power among internal blocs decisive in steering the vote for leadership selection.

Elected Shura Council members, whose number is not publicly disclosed, name the candidate they consider most qualified to lead the Political Bureau, and they do so on election day itself, the sources said.

The election process relies on voting from the base to form local bodies, from neighborhood “branches” up to local Shura councils, which then elect a General Shura Council for the movement. That council then chooses the movement’s leader by a vote that must be no less than 50% plus one.

The movement is organized into three regions: Gaza, the West Bank, and the external leadership. Votes from prisoners in Israeli jails are added, and counted as an additional vote for the West Bank.

Hamas elections are governed by a discreet complex internal rulebook, and are held every four years. They were supposed to begin in March 2025 and end in August of the same year. But the war and the assassinations of a large number of leaders inside and outside the territories prevented elections from taking place as scheduled.

Managing the vacuum

Hamas is witnessing the longest leadership vacuum in its entire history, contradicting its bylaws. Since Sinwar’s assassination, the movement has not elected a new leader.

According to two of the sources, a political bureau member and a source closely tied to another bureau member, the movement is being run by a temporary leadership committee known as “the quintet” before a sixth figure was added.

The committee’s members are Mohamed Ismail Darwish, head of the General Shura Council; Khaled Meshaal, head of the external leadership; Khalil Al-Hayya, the movement’s leader in Gaza and head of the negotiating committee; Zaher Jabarin, the official responsible for the West Bank; and Nizar Awadallah, a longtime leader in Gaza. Then, Moussa Abu Marzouk, deputy head of the external leadership, joined them recently.

The source in the Shura Council said that Abu Marzouk had refused to join "the quintet" because he saw in its formation a violation of the movement’s bylaws.

All four sources confirmed that after halting the war in October 2025, Hamas moved to partially rebuild its organizational bodies in Gaza, electing a new Shura Council and executive office where security conditions allowed.

The New York Times reported that Ezz Al-Din Al-Haddad, commander of the Gaza Brigade and a member of the Qassam Brigades’ inner military council, took over leadership of the military wing after Mohammad Deif.

The message that ignited the dispute

Although tension between the Gaza wing and Hamas' external leadership has long been part of the organizational history, the latest escalation is a precedent that has never surfaced in public.

Social media campaigns moved the disagreements from closed doors into the public sphere, reflecting the depth of the rift. Several accounts on X mounted a campaign against Meshaal, saying he had “traded in the cause throughout the history of the Palestinian struggle” and casting doubt on his financial and political record. Leading this side was an account named Khaled Mansour.

In response, an account on X named Al-Asfoura defended Meshaal and accused Gaza leaders of succumbing to Iranian influence, describing them as “a gang out to sow division.”

As the argument spread, the leadership issued a rare official statement warning against joining the campaigns and calling on cadres to rein in their rhetoric. The statement was widely read as an acknowledgment of a deep internal crisis.

According to two sources, a Political Bureau member and a source tied to another Bureau member, the public spillover followed an internal message sent from Al-Haddad, who was described by the sources as the new leader of the Qassam Brigades in Gaza, sent in September to Hamas leaders in Doha.

In the message, Al-Haddad urged for expediting choosing a new leader. He also proposed, according to the two sources, six figures for the position while authorizing the external leadership to take measures they deemed appropriate to stop the war.

The four sources confirmed the message, and the order of the names it listed: Khaled Meshaal, Moussa Abu Marzouk, Mohamed Ismail Darwish, Zaher Jabarin, Nizar Awadallah, and Khalil Al-Hayya.

The source tied to a Political Bureau member said some leaders later discovered that an intelligence-linked figure internally responsible for communications channels had blocked the message delaying transmission, prompting Al-Haddad to take the risk of opening alternative channels.

A Political Bureau member told Al Manassa that Al-Haddad sent the message through different routes, adding that its text indicated there was no “veto” by the Qassam Brigades on the proposed names. The source, who is aligned with the reformist wing, said the message also emphasized “the order in which they were mentioned.”

By contrast, the Shura Council member said he had no knowledge of any delay or blocking of the message. “The message was sent after the Israeli strike that targeted movement leaders in Doha in September, which required shutting down all communication channels with leaders for more than 20 days,” he said.

The same source, while confirming the message was authentic, said the military wing should not bypass the movement’s institutional and consultative bodies to impose specific names on the top leadership post.

It was notable that an account called CosmoTrade, one of the accounts leading the attack on Meshaal, posted a long tweet rejecting an initiative to halt the war and hand over Israeli captives to Tel Aviv.

The account posted that Al-Haddad had opposed some decisions made after the Oct. 7 Al-Aqsa Flood operation, and that he and Sinwar had a significant disagreement over how to manage the next phase.

The account added, “Yes, Hamas’ political leadership abroad has weak influence, and it is not 100% binding on the leadership in Gaza. Since the martyrdom of the brothers Sinwar and Abu Khaled, or the leader Deif, Abu Suhaib (Al-Haddad), as the current top leader of Hamas inside, has been able to impose his view almost entirely. He is the one who ran the negotiations in practice.”

However, Israeli intelligence assessments dispute the claim of a rift between Al-Haddad and Sinwar. Accounts of those reports suggest Al-Haddad played a pivotal role in Oct. 7 and was closer to being a field coordinator.

According to the Israeli version, Al-Haddad held closed meetings on Oct. 6, 2023 with commanders of the Gaza and Northern brigades to finalize deployment plans and assign tasks. He also issued written orders emphasizing the capture of as many Israeli soldiers as possible and transferring them alive into Gaza, viewing captives as “the strategic pressure card” in any later negotiation track.

In a later development, The Jerusalem Post reported on what it described as a message Al-Haddad sent to Al-Hayya in early September, when US-Egyptian-Qatari mediation was pushing for a partial ceasefire agreement lasting 60 days.

The paper said Al-Haddad told Al-Hayya that Qassam fighters would reject any deal that did not include clear timelines and a roadmap to end Israel’s military presence in Gaza. It said he stressed that a truce without an explicit commitment to full withdrawal would not be acceptable to the field leadership.

Al-Haddad also discussed his central role in Oct. 7 on Al Jazeera in January 2025. He said the Qassam Brigades’ intelligence apparatus had penetrated a server belonging to Israel’s Unit 8200 and obtained a sensitive document that showed an Israeli plan to launch a surprise air assault targeting all resistance factions, followed by a wide, destructive ground attack.

Two visions tug at the movement’s future

The struggle does not appear to be only a contest for the top job. It also reflects a clash between two different visions for the postwar phase and the movements' role in the future.

On one side, Al-Hayya represents the field extension of Sinwar’s approach. The underlying belief is that the movement’s staying rooted inside Gaza is the guarantee of its continued political and organizational presence, even amid military losses.

This current emphasizes building a security-administrative structure inside the enclave and preserving the stature of the military arm and the organizational network of influence as decisive levers in any potential arrangements.

But Al-Hayya’s current presence outside Gaza reduces his field footprint compared with leaders inside the enclave.

On the other side, Meshaal presents himself as a representative of political pragmatism focused on external repositioning. That approach is more open to interim arrangements and to rebuilding regional relationships, particularly with Gulf states, the Sunni bloc, and USA, while maintaining ties with Iran.

Meshaal’s rhetoric is perceived as rational, and aims at improving the movement’s international standing without making direct concessions. But he faces accusations from the Gaza current that he is trying to shift the movement’s center of gravity from inside to outside.

The recent media appearances of Meshaal and Al-Hayya reflect the contrast. Meshaal appeared in a TV interview on Al Jazeera laying out his vision. The very next day, Al-Hayya appeared in a recorded speech distributed through the movement’s platforms delivering a message of different tone and priorities, as if each were presenting their political program to voters.

Comparing the two statements suggests we are facing a competition between a political figure focused on international relationships; Meshaal, and a field figure tied to a regional “resistance axis”; Al-Hayya. And the main differentiators are:

The weapons of the resistance

Meshaal proposes a long-term truce of seven to ten years, alongside “freezing weapons” or “functionally decommissioning them” as a guarantee they would not be used, in exchange for reconstruction.

He rejects full disarmament, describing disarmaming a Palestinian as “taking away their soul.”

Al-Hayya is more hard-liner. He emphasizes that weapons are a “legitimate right guaranteed by international law” as long as occupation exists.

While he signals openness to “assess proposals,” he ties weapons to statehood and self-determination. He does not speak the language of “freezing” or “decommissioning” used by Meshaal.

Regional alliances

Meshaal seeks to disentangle the movement from Iran’s axis, stressing that it does not position itself in one axis against another and that it is open to the Sunni Arab sphere. That appeared in his embrace of the “new Syria” scenario.

Al-Hayya’s rhetoric, by contrast, stays faithful to the narrative of “unity of fronts,” highlighting gratitude and cohesion with axis allies, foremost Hezbollah and Iran.

He also emphasizes shared sacrifices and a unity of destiny.

Running Gaza

When it comes to the “day after,” Meshaal talks about a long-term “technocratic government” to separate governance from the movement and to allow it to focus on the national project.

He also accepts international forces on the borders to protect the truce.

Al-Hayya agrees to a formula for an “independent administrative committee,” but he presents it in a defiant frame, calling for Gaza to be handed over immediately, in a way that suggests he believes the demand is unrealistic.

He strongly opposes outside tutelage and the proposed board of peace associated with Trump. He prioritizes humanitarian assistance and easing the suffering.

The intended audience

Meshaal directs his message toward the international community, Western public opinion, academia and media circles. He draws on the language of international law and UN resolutions, seeking to present the movement as a political actor.

Al-Hayya addresses the organizational base, and the families of the martyrs. He relies on revolutionary and religious language, reinforced by the legitimacy of steadfastness and the field.

In his framing, Meshaal casts himself as a leader able to end the movement’s isolation through calculated tactical concessions that would open the path to reconstruction and Sunni Arab openness.

Al-Hayya, by contrast, presents himself as the bearer of Sinwar’s legacy and an extension of the regional resistance axis. In his view, legitimacy is derived from armed struggle and field steadfastness—not political maneuver.

A centrist candidate

While the contest, in its current form, is largely between two opposing wings led by Meshaal and Al-Hayya, Moussa Abu Marzouk stands out as a figure representing a middle space between the poles, even if his realistic chances appear limited.

Abu Marzouk is a historic player in the movement’s organizational structure. He was Hamas’ first Political Bureau chief and is credited with a leading role in reshaping the movement’s bodies in Gaza and the West Bank after Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was arrested in 1989.

He entered Gaza secretly at the time, and—alongside the movement’s founders—helped lay the foundations for its civilian and military structures.

Abu Marzouk was detained during a visit to USA in 1995 for nearly two years. The US indictment said he worked to coordinate and finance Hamas activities inside and outside the US.

Marzouk’s detention pushed the movement to elect Meshaal as Political Bureau chief in 1996.

The decision accumulated resentments between Abu Marzouk and Meshaal and some other leaders, as Abu Marzouk believed a new leader should not have been elected during his detention.

Although institutionally part of the “external leadership,” Abu Marzouk’s experience inside Gaza in his youth, and his role supporting Sheikh Yassin and running the movement’s affairs in Gaza and the West Bank, gave him a centrist posture and a more moderate political outlook.

He sees armed resistance as one tool in the movement’s political toolbox alongside other tools.

As for Hamas’ relationship with Iran, he rejects what he describes as Tehran’s agenda to dominate the region. At the same time, he values Iran’s role in supporting the resistance militarily before 2012 and financially up to today, but that does not mean, in his view, that the movement’s decision-making is subordinate to Iran.

That middle ground, according to the Shura Council member who spoke to Al Manassa, does not give Abu Marzouk enough votes to make him a consequential third contender in this battle.

The Iranian role

Over recent years, accusations against Hamas have grown over alleged dependence on Iran and how much Tehran influences political and military decision-making circles inside the movement.

Hamas’ opponents—particularly in the region and in some Palestinian circles—argue that the relationship has moved beyond political alliance and financial and military support into something resembling a structural attachment to a regional axis led by Tehran.

In that view, the relationship constrains the movement’s independence and makes its battlefield and political calculations part of a broader network for managing Iranian influence across the region.

Hamas leaders, by contrast, say the relationship with Iran is based on “supporting resistance” without organizational or ideological subordination. Under that narrative, they say, the movement remains an independent Palestinian actor governed by internal priorities.

But the accounts of Al-Manassa’s sources suggest the Iranian role is one of the core fault lines between the two currents.

According to two sources, a Bureau member and a source closely tied to another Bureau member, the movement faced growing Iranian pressure and intervention in the years before Al-Aqsa Flood.

The sources said the influence of a Quds Force officer, Mohammad Saeed Izadi, known as “Hajj Ramadan,” expanded inside Hamas decision-making circles.

The Quds Force, the IRGC's elite extraterritorial arm, spearheads Iran's covert operations by training, arming, and coordinating proxy forces such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis across the Middle East to advance Tehran's regional influence against rivals like Israel and the US.

The two sources said Hajj Ramadan came to have direct contact with Qassam Brigades leaders inside and outside Gaza—something that, they said, had been treated as a red line during Meshaal’s leadership until it ended in 2017.

The source tied to a Political Bureau member said Hajj Ramadan asked Qassam leaders to remove Samir Fandi (Abu Amer), the official responsible for Qassam operations in Lebanon.

Israel later killed Fandi alongside Saleh Al-Arouri in a rocket attack targeting Beirut’s southern suburb in January 2024.

The source said Hajj Ramadan viewed Fandi as aligned with Khaled Meshaal.

Documents that Israel says it found in the possession of movement leaders during the war suggest an unprecedented expansion of Iranian influence inside decision-making circles—not only through military and logistical support but also through control of funding routes as a political and organizational pressure tool. Hamas has not commented on the documents’ contents.

One of the documents, dated July 30, 2020, says Iran transferred more than $154 million to Hamas' military wing from 2014 to 2020. Part of that money was delivered directly to Sinwar inside Gaza, unlike the usual financial pattern where funds passed through the political leadership abroad.

The documents also describe later correspondence that Tehran created a parallel funding channel run by the Quds Force figure known as “Hajj Ramadan,” sending money directly to Gaza without the knowledge of the leadership.

A message attributed to Ismail Haniyeh and addressed to Sinwar on Sept. 24, 2022, says the Iranians halted funding to him for several months.

The message says what reached Gaza came through direct transfers from Hajj Ramadan. It asks, according to the leaked text, for “cooperation to support the Qassam Brigades” with what Hajj Ramadan sent directly—in reference to a separate funding line that bypassed the Political Bureau.

Another document says part of the Iranian money was transferred to Gaza through special cash payments, while other payments were handled through external channels overseen by Haniyeh.

That arrangement, Israel alleges, created financial duality inside the movement and exposed disputes over resource distribution and over who held the legitimacy to make financial and organizational decisions.

Overall, the documents, according to Israel’s narrative, suggest Tehran was no longer simply a supporter of the movement. They suggest it became able to tilt the balance within.

If authentic, the documents would mark a turning point in the balance of power inside the movement in the years leading up to Al-Aqsa Flood.

Hamas has remained silent about these leaks. Questions about the motives and timing of selective publication surround the leaks.

They were possibly leaked as intelligence ammunition among other tools of war—intended to shift attention away from the human cost and to justify continued military operations.

Iranian contact and a reassessment

Despite a historically tense relationship between Tehran and Meshaal, after he decided to leave Syria in 2012 and rejected Assad's abuse of Syrians, the source close to a Political Bureau member said Iranians now recognize the scale of their mistakes. He says those mistakes included their direct reliance on Hajj Ramadan in Gaza and their bypassing the political leadership.

Tehran is now seeking opening new channels of communication with Meshaal. The source described that step as consistent with what he sees as a new regional posture that leans toward distancing from the heat of the war and building more open relationships with the Arab region and Gulf states.

A Political Bureau member said recent discussions with the Iranian team that took over communication with Hamas after Hajj Ramadan deals with the movement regardless of who leads it, adding that “there is no veto against Meshaal,”.

The Shura Council member agreed, saying states prioritize their own interests first, then the movement’s influence in the Palestinian file. In that view, he said, states do not change their positions based on the name of the movement’s leader.

Practically, the shift would mean Iran withdrawing exclusive cover from the more hard-line “Gaza” current and giving the “external leadership” current an opening that had not been expected.

The Jan. 2026 crucible

Against these fast-moving changes—on the battlefield and in the corridors of regional politics—the expected General Shura Council meeting in early 2026 does not look like a routine election.

It appears, rather, as the most consequential milestone in Hamas’ history, one that will define its political and military identity for the next decade.

The movement is not choosing between Meshaal or Al-Hayya. It is weighing two contradictory projects, each with its own base and motivations: “external repositioning” and bridge-building to secure political survival versus “field entrenchment” that treats continued confrontation as an irreversible, existential choice.

Between internal pressures and regional shifts, the question remains: Will the pragmatism of the external leadership—now supported by newly flexible regional conditions—succeed in saving what can be saved?

Or will legitimacy derived from armed struggle assert itself from beneath the rubble of Gaza?