Red Sea fault lines: Can Cairo-Riyadh counterbalance the Zionist-Emirati alliance?
It was no mere diplomatic flourish when Cairo declared its alignment with Riyadh on the escalating crises in Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, and Gaza. Rather, it was a clear signal that Egypt had cast its lot with Saudi Arabia's recent maneuverings to curtail Emirati influence across several regional arenas—and to push back against plans to dismantle regional states, a project Abu Dhabi is pursuing in service of Israel's broader designs.
According to a well-informed Yemeni official who spoke with Al Manassa, the presidential statement that followed President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's meeting with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan in Cairo last week was only issued after Cairo received firm assurances from Riyadh regarding the Yemeni file.
Chief among those assurances, that the vacuum left by dismantling the Southern Transitional Council (STC) would not be filled by the Islah Party, the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt remains deeply concerned about Islah gaining a foothold at the gateway to the Red Sea.
Egyptian anxieties over Yemen
Cairo's perspective on Yemen is shaped not just by geopolitics but by immediate security and economic concerns. As global maritime trade gradually returns to the Suez Canal—following nearly two years of Houthi military attacks on ships that disturbed traffic through the critical waterway—Egypt fears that Abu Dhabi's apparent intent to reignite tensions in Bab El-Mandeb could again drive shippers toward the Cape of Good Hope, bypassing Egypt entirely. That scenario would spell direct losses to the country's already fragile foreign currency reserves.
Equally worrisome for Egypt is the specter of either Islah taking control of the Red Sea chokepoint or of an Emirati-backed secessionist entity dominating southern Yemen. The latter would effectively place Suez Canal shipping under the sway of actors aligned with Israel's strategic vision. That alignment was laid bare in Israel's push to establish military bases in Somaliland—a self-declared state Abu Dhabi recently unilaterally recognized.
In the wake of the Saudi foreign minister's visit to Cairo, Riyadh, working through its allies in Yemen, successfully extended its authority over the entire southern region, from Al-Mahra to Aden. Preparations are now underway for an inclusive southern conference that will bring together leaders from nearly all southern factions—including members of the STC, which has reportedly dissolved itself after rumors that its president, Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, fled to the UAE.
Sources suggest that Egypt will participate officially in the conference in support of resolving the southern question within the framework of a unified Yemeni state.
A multi-pronged partnership
Notably, the latest statement from the Saudi-led “Coalition to Support Legitimacy” pointed the finger directly at the UAE. It alleged that the aircraft which flew Al-Zubaidi to Abu Dhabi had previously been spotted in conflict zones including Libya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. It also drew attention to the ship that carried him—sailing under a St. Kitts and Nevis flag—identifying it as the same vessel, the Greenland, that had delivered combat vehicles and weapons to Al-Mukalla port in Yemen from Fujairah. Saudi forces targeted that ship late last month.
On the Houthi front, the official who spoke to Al Manassa noted that coordination had occurred with both the group's leadership and with Tehran via Omani mediation to ensure the Houthis stayed out of the southern showdown. While the Houthis even offered to support Riyadh's moves against Emirati-backed forces, Saudi Arabia reportedly declined, opting instead to handle the crisis with its recognized government allies before returning to the path of comprehensive national dialogue.
Abu Dhabi's encirclement
Cairo's policymakers do not view the Yemeni conflict in isolation. Instead, they see it as part of a broader pattern in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia align on combustible regional issues—such as the war in Sudan—where both back the unity of Sudanese institutions, civilian and military alike. In contrast, Emirati actions, from Somalia to Ethiopia to Sudan, consistently appear to empower forces intent on fracturing Egypt's strategic neighborhood.
In what seems to be a rapid response from Riyadh to bolster Cairo's stance in Sudan—a country the Saudis also consider integral to their Red Sea security—reports emerged that Saudi Arabia supplied the Sudanese national army with a military aid package, including fighter jets from Pakistan. This move suggests that the confrontation with the UAE will not be limited to Yemen but will extend to any theater where Abu Dhabi is seen as a destabilizing force, according to the same diplomatic source.
Following years of quiet encroachment, it now appears that Abu Dhabi, with direct backing from Tel Aviv, is attempting to encircle Egypt and Saudi Arabia in their traditional spheres of influence. From Libya in the west to Sudan in the south and onward to Yemen and Somalia, this creeping encroachment has turned the UAE—a load-bearing economic partner—into a political liability and a security threat to Egypt.
Cairo’s risk calculus
Despite Egypt's significant economic ties to the UAE, its strategic calculus now favors long-term regional security over short-term financial gains. Preserving Yemen's unity, preventing Sudan's disintegration, and securing the Red Sea are non-negotiables for Cairo. With concerns mounting over Emirati penetration into critical sectors of Egypt's economy, there's rising alarm that such involvement could eventually compromise national decision-making.
The much-touted “alignment” of Egyptian and Saudi views on Yemen, Sudan, and the Red Sea represents, in part, a belated recognition of the existential threat posed by Israel's effort to redraw the map of the Middle East—a strategy that does not spare either Cairo or Riyadh.
The price of hesitation
Over the past decade, Egypt has paid a steep price for its reluctance to engage fully with the region's multiplying crises, choosing instead to turn inward. Today, it faces a stark choice. Assert its red lines through self-reliance and alliances with like-minded regional actors, or surrender to a future in which its sea lanes, borders, and spheres of influence are managed by its adversaries—albeit through proxies.
The fates of the Red Sea, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Libya are not isolated concerns. They are fronts in a single, multifaceted battle—one that demands that Cairo and Riyadh lead a unified Arab-Islamic front before the region is engulfed by the flames of a Zionist project that promises to spare no one.