External war, internal fractures: A separatist moment for Iran?

Iranians are increasingly voicing fears that ongoing US and Israeli military operations could fracture the country and embolden separatist movements, especially following public calls for coordinated action and campaigns framed around “self-determination.” These anxieties tap into long-standing ethnic tensions within Iran, where non-Persian communities—estimated at 40 to 50% of the population—have long complained of economic marginalization and cultural suppression since the 1979 revolution.

Iran is an ethnically diverse state of nearly 90 million people. Persians constitute roughly 61% of the population. The remainder includes Azeris—the largest minority, concentrated in the northwest—alongside Kurds in the west, Arabs in Khuzestan, Baloch in the southeast, as well as Lurs, Turkmen and other communities. While ethnic pluralism has long been a structural feature of the Iranian state, some strategists outside the country have openly described it as a geopolitical vulnerability.

In his first public statement following Iran’s confirmation of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s killing, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Larijani warned that Iran would not allow Israel and USA to dismantle or exploit the state. Tehran has consistently argued that an unstated objective of the US-Israeli war is to fragment Iran from within. Larijani, a pragmatic conservative and former parliament speaker, has emerged as a central power broker in the post-Khamenei vacuum, leveraging ties to both the Assembly of Experts and the security establishment.

He warned that any actions by what he termed “separatist groups” would trigger a severe response, urging national unity in confronting what he described as wartime challenges.

Several separatist movements remain active across Iran. In the south, Ahwazi groups operate along the Arabian Gulf in oil-rich Khuzestan province. In Sistan-Baluchistan, near the borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan, Baloch armed groups—most notably Jaish Al-Adl—have carried out attacks against the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij militia. Designated a terrorist organization by the United States, Jaish Al-Adl has intensified its operations since 2024, claiming responsibility for bombings and ambushes amid demands for greater resource equity in one of Iran’s poorest regions.

Kurdish factions are also active along the Iran-Iraq border, particularly in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. They have coordinated with Iranian Kurdish groups to form a political coalition seeking to overthrow the Islamic Republic and advance Kurdish self-determination. The Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, formed in February 2026, unites major parties including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI) and Komala, building on a legacy of insurgency dating back to the short-lived Mahabad Republic in 1946.

Separatist mobilization amid war

Amid the latest US-Israeli strikes on Tehran and other cities, the Coordination Council of Ahwazi Organizations released a statement asserting that “non-Persian peoples were forcibly annexed into Iran’s political geography” and continue to endure marginalization and repression—conditions it described as destabilizing for both the region and the international community.

The statement, obtained by Al Manassa, emphasized Ahwazi national unity and the pursuit of “legitimate rights,” framing collective mobilization as essential to securing freedom, restoring national entitlements, and achieving self-determination. Ahwazis—primarily Arabic speakers in Khuzestan—argue that their region maintained historical autonomy before incorporation during the Pahlavi era and cite water diversion policies and environmental degradation as ongoing grievances.

Ali Kazem Al-Ahwazi, a member of the council’s executive body, told Al Manassa that preparations are underway for what he described as a “large-scale operation for the future,” seeking to capitalize on US-Israeli strikes in Shushtar and Ahvaz to lay groundwork for action.

He said Ahwazi activists abroad are coordinating with networks inside Iran and aligning with other opposition currents—including self-determination groups, republicans, monarchists advocating the return of the shah’s son, and even the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran. The PMOI, exiled since 1986 and removed from the US terrorist list in 2012, has increased anti-regime broadcasting amid the current crisis.

The Ahwazi official acknowledged that timing remains critical. “We are waiting for the right opportunity,” he said, noting that any move during open war would likely be met with overwhelming force. Their strategy, he suggested, depends on broader destabilization before “entering Ahwaz and seizing all government centers to regain our state and our stolen right.”

Identity fault lines

Ali Jassim, responsible for field outreach to Iran’s non-Persian communities, described what he called an “identity” crisis rooted in the mandatory use of Persian in education and state institutions, despite widespread use of minority languages at home. Iran’s constitution designates Persian as the sole official language and this “creates a cultural and linguistic disconnect that separates the state from those minorities,” he said.

Jassim told Al Manassa that minority groups remain divided in their political aspirations: some seek institutional inclusion and power-sharing, others advocate an ethnically based federal system, and a faction calls for full independence. “That is what will happen in the coming period,” he said, predicting deeper fragmentation.

Tehran, for its part, accuses Israeli intelligence of training and coordinating with separatist groups. In August, the Revolutionary Guard in Khorasan province announced the arrest of eight members of what it described as a Mossad-linked separatist cell. According to an IRGC statement on Telegram, the suspects received specialized online training and allegedly transmitted coordinates of strategic sites and senior military figures to Mossad intelligence officers during the 12-day “Zionist war.”

The partition question

Beyond internal mobilization, a broader strategic debate looms: what would fragmentation of Iran actually produce?

Some policy circles in Washington and Tel Aviv have long discussed Iran’s ethnic composition as leverage. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies has publicly advocated exploiting Iran’s multi-ethnic structure to weaken the state. Now and during Israel’s previous military campaign against Iran, Israeli media commentary has openly floated the idea of an international coalition to support partition and offer security guarantees to minority regions willing to break away.

The potential outcome, according to many analysts, would not necessarily be stable self-determination movements but a redrawing of the regional map. Analysts warn that the breakup of Iran could generate a patchwork of weak, ethnically defined statelets: a rump Persian state; an Azerbaijani entity in the northwest, pulled between Ankara and Baku; a Kurdish region in the west; an Arab entity in oil-rich Khuzestan; and a Baloch entity in the southeast straddling sensitive trade corridors.

None of these successor entities would likely operate in isolation. Each could become deeply dependent on external patrons—whether the United States, Israel, Turkey, Gulf monarchies or other regional powers—turning fragmentation into a new arena of geopolitical competition.

The human consequences would likely be severe. Iran’s ethnic communities are not cleanly separated into territorial blocs. Azeris live in Tehran; Kurds, Lurs and Persians are interspersed across western provinces; Arabs and Persians coexist in Khuzestan. Drawing ethnic borders in such a landscape risks mass displacement, intercommunal violence and prolonged instability.

Historical precedents—from Yugoslavia to post-2003 Iraq and Libya—illustrate how state collapse in multi-ethnic societies can trigger cycles of conflict that outlast the original political rupture.

Regional escalation and strategic stakes

The latest wave of US-Israeli strikes followed negotiations mediated by Oman earlier this year over prospects for reviving an Iran nuclear agreement. Those talks—building on Muscat’s history of quiet diplomacy, including its role in the 2013 nuclear channel—ultimately faltered.

The operations mark the second major round of US-Israeli military action against Iran in recent months, following the 12-day Israel-Iran war in June. During that conflict, US airstrikes targeted Iranian facilities in an effort to deter Tehran from developing its nuclear program. Tehran responded with missile strikes on the US Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar before President Trump announced a ceasefire agreement. 

As external military pressure intensifies and internal fault lines re-emerge, Iran faces a dual challenge: deterring adversaries abroad while preserving cohesion at home.

The strategic question is no longer confined to battlefield dynamics. It now touches on whether war at the periphery could reshape the territorial integrity of the Iranian state itself.