Trump's dam gambit: The GERD & the "CC" diplomacy

 For perhaps the first time, a high-level diplomatic letter was sent not only to its main recipient but also copied to others using the "CC" feature. While that might seem like a minor procedural detail, it warrants serious attention. The letter President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi received from former US President Donald Trump was anything but conventional—and its timing and motives deserve scrutiny, even though this is not the first time Trump has shown interest in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

It made sense for Trump to copy the letter to Ethiopian President Taye Atske Selassie and Sudan’s Sovereignty Council leader Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, given their longstanding involvement in the GERD dispute—from Ethiopia’s decision to begin construction 15 years ago, to the 2015 Declaration of Principles signed in Khartoum, through years of conflicting negotiation rounds, and ending with the dam’s completion in July 2025.

But copying the letter to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed points to something far more ambitious—perhaps a broader vision Trump is pursuing. There’s also an implied "CC" to Israel, which has closely monitored the Nile issue for years. By referencing Gaza and the still-unclear second phase of his peace plan, Trump explicitly brought Israel into the scene as a key player.

El-Sisi’s reply could be described as measured. Egypt did not immediately welcome the offer of renewed US-brokered talks—and for good reason. The mediation framework Trump proposed in his letter belongs to a pre-GERD world. It might have made sense during his first term, when his then-Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin oversaw talks focused on water-sharing and mutual electricity benefits.

A proposal from a bygone era

Article II of the Declaration of Principles emphasizes regional integration, sustainability, and development, framing the dam as a tool for generating clean, reliable energy to support cross-border cooperation and economic growth.

During the 2018–2020 negotiation phase, the three countries agreed to an electricity grid integration project, with Sudan at its core, linking the north and south. But momentum collapsed as negotiations stalled, Egypt’s appeal to the UN Security Council fell flat, and African Union mediation failed to bring Addis Ababa back to the table.

Trump’s letter calls for a “once and for all” solution to Nile water-sharing and voices his opposition to unilateral control over the world’s largest freshwater source. But his message does not reflect the urgency of the current moment—especially after nearly 2 billion cubic meters were discharged from the dam’s main reservoir in November, an 80% increase over the historical average. Egypt responded with a sharp warning about the dangers of unilateral and erratic management, as well as the lack of timely data sharing on dam operations.

Ethiopia’s position is starkly pragmatic. Its leaders now ask—bluntly and unapologetically—“what is there to negotiate, now that the dam is complete?”

It’s a blunt, even provocative question. But it strikes at the heart of the issue and exposes the disconnect between Trump’s rhetoric and the current reality. Any new approach must address tangible harm—not theoretical risk—and be rooted in existing disputes, not abstract principles. That includes possible recourse to the International Court of Justice, drawing on its past rulings and international law.

Trump’s tactics: patterns of improvisation and pressure

The gap between Trump’s proposals and the reality on the ground raises a broader question: What exactly is Trump’s strategy?

To unpack that, we can turn to “The Art of the Deal,” a book that becomes increasingly relevant as Trump—now in his eighties—tries to reshape global politics with a small, loyal circle of advisers and open disdain for traditional US institutions.

Trump blends several strategic negotiating tactics: expanding the number of stakeholders, staying flexible, and never committing to one party or approach. He often seeks to widen the circle of potential beneficiaries to build broader support—counting on personal charisma and gut instinct over detailed studies, which he sees as a waste of time and money.

He believes imagination and flair can generate influence—enough to convince his counterpart that a deal is in their best interest.

Apply this lens to Trump’s repeated statements on GERD—as well as on Gaza and Iran—and a pattern emerges. Trump consistently employs a recognizable pattern in his diplomatic maneuvers: he offers once-unthinkable, half-formed solutions; expands the circle of involved parties to include both current stakeholders and potential future investors; floats contradictory or ambiguous ideas to test various reactions; and relentlessly chases a historic moment in which he can cast himself as the architect of triumph.

And thanks to his improvisational flair—both in politics and public performance—he surprises allies and adversaries alike. The use of "CC" in the GERD letter might be one such move: a way to involve, provoke, and gauge the readiness of other actors. All the while, Trump watches and calculates, looking for openings that could benefit him—or close allies like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, perhaps the only figure capable of mediating between Trump, the would-be Nobel laureate, and Ethiopia’s Peace Prize-winning Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

Israel’s maps of disassembly and redesign

Israeli ambitions for Nile water are longstanding and explicit. Since the late 1970s, when President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin proposed the “New Zamzam” project to divert Nile water to the Negev Desert and eventually Jerusalem, the idea has resurfaced at key moments. Though it disappeared from public discourse after Sadat’s assassination, Israel never abandoned the broader goal.

Today, while tensions with Egypt have grown, Israel’s ties with Ethiopia are steadily deepening. Israel has repeatedly denied providing direct support for GERD, but it plays a major role in developing Ethiopia’s water and energy infrastructure. In February 2025, the two countries signed a cooperation agreement focused on water infrastructure and technology. Israeli investments in Ethiopian renewable energy, manufacturing, irrigation, and agriculture are also on the rise.

There is an unmistakable link between Israel’s recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland and its posture on GERD. Both are part of a broader strategy to reshape regional geopolitics, secure investment opportunities, and expand military footprints—Israeli and otherwise—across East Africa. These moves are in step with efforts by US right-wing circles to reconfigure the Horn of Africa to counter Chinese and Turkish influence. Israel, again, is fully aligned with this agenda.

Gulf states on the sidelines

As for the Gulf powers Trump wants to pull into the GERD negotiations, there is little sign either will decisively support Egypt or Sudan.

Saudi Arabia has played virtually no role throughout the negotiation phases and has moved steadily to deepen ties with Addis Ababa.

The UAE, long a key Ethiopian ally, has occasionally tried to mediate—most recently in the summer of 2023, when Mohammed bin Zayed visited both Cairo and Addis Ababa to quietly push for renewed talks under the banner of joint electricity cooperation.

Today, however, Abu Dhabi’s influence appears to have waned. Ongoing tensions with Riyadh over southern Yemen, an ambiguous stance on Somaliland, and its disastrous entanglement in Sudan have eroded its ability to play a constructive role. These crises threaten Egypt’s strategic interests and have turned what was once a promising vision of regional electricity integration into little more than a pipe dream.

All of this makes Trump’s overture increasingly unserious. But his push to bring in new players still poses risks—especially in light of his meeting with El-Sisi in Davos. His only real goal is to pad his record with another fictional peace achievement, even if it means conjuring a deal out of thin air.

The painful truth is more than a decade after Egypt signed a burdensome Declaration of Principles, there is still nothing to show for it. GERD is now a geopolitical reality. Even if Egypt manages to avoid its most immediate dangers, the dam will remain a tool for political leverage and regional pressure.